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I. INTRODUCTION
In any civilized society the most important task is achieving a
jnoper balance between freedom and order. In wartime, reason and
history both suggest that this balance shifts to some degree in favor of
order—in favor of the government's ability to deal with conditions that
threaten the national l ^
William H. Rehnquist (1924-2005)
The Protect America Act of 2007: Modifications to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (Protect America Act)^ was
not the first revision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA)," nor will it be the last. When the United States Congress
amended FISA by passing the Protect America Act in early
August 2007, its action was unusually swift.^  Although some
critics chastised Congress for passing the bill,' there were
1. WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST, ALL THE L/\WS BUT ONE: GIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 222
(Alfred A. Knopf) (1998).
2. Protect America Act of 2007: Modifications to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 52 (2007) [hereinafter Protect Ametica
Act].
3. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.G. § 1801 (2000).
4. Open Gongress, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/110-sl927/show (last visited
Dec. 31, 2008). On Augtist 1, 2007, Senator Mitch McGonnell introduced the Protect
America Act. Id. On Atigust 3, 2007, the United States Senate passed Senator
McGonnell's bill by a comfortable 60-28 margin. Id. On August 4, 2007, the United
States Hotise of Representatives passed the bill by a similar margin of 227-183. Id. On
August 5, 2007, President George W. Bush signed the Protect America Act into law. Id.
5. Some of the negative conmientaiy on the Protect America Act contained the ustial
emotional ad hominem attacks against the government. See, e.g., Aziz Huq, Data Milling
Our Liberties, THE NATION, Aug. 7, 2007,
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070813/huq2 (arguing that "[c]ongressional
oversight is even more laughable"). Htiq writes, "Attorney General Gonzales, that
paragon of probity and full disclostire, is reqtiired to report not on the program's overall
operations, but solely on 'incidents of noncompliance.'" Id.
George W. Bush has perfected the art of ramming ill-considered legislation
through Gongress by hyping emergencies that don't exist. He did it with the
USA Patriot [sic] Act, the atithorization for the Iraq war, the Military
Gommissions Act and now the 'Protect America Act' which amends the
Foreign Intelligence Stirveillance Act (FISA).
Marjorie Gohn, http:/Avww.maijoriecohn.com (Aug. 9, 2007, 19:52 PST). Professor
Gohn writes that in its response to "fear-mongering by the Bush administration, the
Democrat-led Gongress put its stamp of approval on the unconstitutional wiretapping of
Americans." Id. To reflect their strong opposition to every provision of the bill, the
American Givil Liberties Union (AGLU) issued a so-called "Fact Sheet" on the Protect
America Act which they entitled the "Police America Act." AGLU Webpage,
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/nsaspying/31203res20070807.html (last visited Dec. 31,
2008). Tim Lynch of the Gato Institute wrote: "[M]ost legislators put their reservations
aside, curl up into the fetal position and say 'I am against terrorists too,' as they vote in
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pragmatic reasons for favoring the Protect America Act. For
example, it provided a positive framework for ensuring that the
proper rule of law kept pace with the changes in technology,
and it also rightly appreciated the emerging threats to national
well-being from both al-Qa'eda-styled terrorism and other
foreign machinations. If one couples the phenomenal technical
advances in telecommunications technolog)' with an
acknowledgement of the growing threats to national security
posed by hostile nations, it is obvious that the nation's
intelligence community" must be properly equipped with the
necessary tools to protect the nation. As Congress continues to
revise and amend FISA, the Protect America Act of 2007 serves
as a reminder of the many policy and legal tensions involved as
the country grapples with balancing cherished civil liberties
against the need for increased security and government
accountability in this post-9/11 world.'
Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to provide a brief
overview of the efficacy of the Protect America Act in the
context of the new ground it covers.** Given that the United
States of America is in a state of war" with the al-Qa'eda terror
favor [of the Protect America Act]." Decían McCullagh and Anne Broache, FAQ: Hmu Far
Does the New Wiretap Law Go?, CNET NEVVS.COM, Atig. 6, 2007,
h ttpy/news.cnet.com/FAQ-How-far-does-the-nevv-wire tap-law-go—page-2/2100-1029_3-
6201032-2.html?tag=mncol (last visited Dec. 31, 2008).
6. Several federal entities collect foreign intelligence, such as the National Security
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Department of Defense, and the Department of Homeland Security among others.
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, DNI HANDBOOK, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED
STATES INTELLIGENCE COÍMMUNITY (2007), available at
http://www.dni.gov/who_what/061222_DNIHandbook_Final.pdf.
7. The Center for Terrorism Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio,
Texas was established in 2003 in order to examine current and potential legal issues
related to terrorism in light of the challenge of achieving and maintaining a proper
balance between global security and civil justice. St. Maiy's University School of Law,
Center for Terrorism Law Webpage,
http://www.stmaiytx.edti/ctl/display.php?go=about (last visited Dec. 31, 2008). This
goal is piusued throtigh teaching; professional exchanges such as s)inposia and
consultations; writing, commenting on and ptiblishing written materials; training; and
ensuring access to extensive information resources regarding terrorism. Id.
8. For an excellent overview of the debate see CRS Report RL34279, The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act: A Brief Overuietu of Selected Issues, Elizabeth B. Bazan,
(December 14, 2007, http://www.scribd.com/doc/3898188/RL34279).
9. The term "War on Terror" is one of many phrases used to describe the ongoing
conflict between the United States of America and the al-Qa'eda terror network, al-
Qa'eda-styled terror grotips, and any state that sponsors or supports them. See generally
President Ceorge W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American
People (Sept. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Bush] (citing al-Qa'eda and the nations that
stipport that "radical network of terrorists" as the enemy in the United States' War on
Terror). The beginning of this War on Terror is set as September 11, 2001, when 19
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network and al-Qa'eda-styled terrorists,'" providing the U.S.
intelligence community with the proper means to effectively
combat the evolving threats to national security presents a legal
and policy challenge that requires thoughtful attention from all
three branches of the government.
II. OVERVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
In a similar way, monitoring the electronic communications of
foreign nationals outside this country who are believed to be affiliated
with terrorist groups—particularly during a period of congressionally
authorized war—is reasonable and thus not constrained by the Fourth
Amendment." And monitoring the electronic communications of
foreign terrorists is even more reasonable when they are communicating
with people inside the United States, who might be plotting the next
catastrophic terrorist attack."
Robert F. Turner
A. Basic Framework of FISA
As correcdy stated in a 2007 CRS Report to Congress, FISA
was "enacted in response [to] . . . revelations with regard to past
abuses of electronic surveillance for national security purposes
members of the terrorist al-Qa'eda organization hijacked four domestic passenger jets
while in flight and used them to kill approximately 3,000 people on U,S, soil. Id.
10, Prompted by the Supreme Cotirt's 2006 holding in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U,S,
557 (2006), Congress passed the Military Commissions Act (MCA) in October 2006,
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Ptib, L, No, 109-366, 120 Stat, 2600, 10 U,S,C, § 948
(2006), Not only did the MCA provide affirmative legal approval to the creation of
military commissions and affirm Congressional authorization for war, it also provided
the clearest indication that Congress was utilizing the law of war to deal with certain
"unlawful enemy combatants," Id. at § 948a,
The MCA defines these individuals as follows:
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially
supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not
a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al
Qa'eda, or associated forces); or
(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Militaiy
Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an tmlawful enemy
combatant by a Combatant Status Re\iew Tribunal or another competent
tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary of
Defense,
Id.
11, H,S, V, Benkahla, 437 F, Supp, 2d 541, 544 (E.D, V, 2006),
12, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong, (2007), p, 12,
http://www,virginia,edu/cnsl/pdf/Turner-HJC-5SeptO7-(final),pdf (last visited Dec, 31,
2008) (statement of Robert F, Turner),
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and to the somewhat uncertain state of the law on the subject."'^
In tandem with Executive Order 12333" and Title III of the
1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act," FISA
codifies in federal law the procedures associated with how the
intelligence community conducts electronic surveillance and
physical searches'" for the acquisition of foreign intelligence for
reasons of national security. Since its passage in 1978,' FISA has
withstood a variety of legal challenges,'" most of which concern
possible Fourth Amendment violations.'^
In passing FISA, Congress intended to strike an appropriate
balance between the need to protect national security with the
need to protect civil liberty rights of Americans. FISA was
certainly never intended to adversely impact American
government intelligence community activities directed at places
or people outside of the United States.^ "
FISA created two layers of special courts: one to issue orders
and the other to provide review. The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC) is a "secret" court comprised of
13. ELIZABETH B. BAZ/\N, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (CRS) REPORT FOR
CONGRESS 5 P.L. 110-55, THE PROTECT AMERICA ACT OF 2007: MODIFICATIONS TO THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (AUGUST 23,2007).
14. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 213 (1982).
15. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520. Title III requires more due process than the
constitutional minimum established by case law. Under Title til, a warrant must include:
(1) identity of the applicant; (2) specific details of the criminal offense; (3) particular
descriptions of the facilities to be employed, including the types of electronic
commimications to be intercepted and the identity of the person whose conversation is
to be intercepted; (4) description of less intrusive law enforcement techniques that had
failed or would fail if employed; (5) specific time period of the electronic surveillance:
and (6) all previous applications for a warrant for the same surveillance. Id. § 2518.
16. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1829 (2000) (amending FISA in 1994 to provide
authorization to conduct physical searches in addition to electronic surveillance).
17. See, e.g.. Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book
U, S. Rep. No. 94-755, at 169 (1976) (discussing the political background and context of
the FISA stattite), available
«<http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreportlla.htm.
18. See Richard Henry Seamon & Willam Dylan Gardner, The Patriot Act and the Wall
Between Foreign Intelligence and Lazo Enforcement, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 319, 359-65
(2005) (tracing Fourth Amendment challenges to warrantless surveillance before and
after the pas.sage of FISA).
19. U.S. CONST, amend. fV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and partictilarly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Id.
20. See infra notes 36-68 and accompanying te::t.
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eleven non-disclosed federal district court judges appointed by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.^' Since these appointed
judges are federal district court judges, the FISC is a proper
Article III court.^ ^ A FISC judge rules on the submitted
intelligence community applications" for court orders
authorizing or denying electronic surveillance and physical
searches." The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review (FISCR) is also a secret court and consists of three non-
disclosed federal district or federal appellate judges with the
power to review FISC actions.^ ^
The basic mechanics for how the FISC court order process
works reveal a stringent system of agency checks and cross-
checks prior to submission to the FISC judge. An application to
conduct an electronic surveillance is initiated by a federal
intelligence community officer. After going through a variety of
internal agency bureaucratic procedures and rules, culminating
with the approval of the Attorney Ceneral, the application is
then presented under oath to a FISC judge.^'' The central
language in the application must clearly address a number of
issues to include the following: (1) how the target of the
electronic surveillance is to be identified"" as well as the
information relied on by the government to demonstrate that
the target is either a "foreign power"^ ** or an "agent of a foreign
power;"^" (2) the type of surveillance which will be used;''" (3) the
minimization procedures to be employed;"" and (4) certification
by a high-ranking Executive Branch official that he specially
determines that the information sought is "foreign intelligence
21. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803(a)-1803(b) (2000).
22. U.S. CONST, art. Ill, § 1.
23. But see 50 U.S.C. § 1824(e)(l)(A) (2000) (providing authority to the U.S.
Attorney General to condtict an "emergency" surveillance or search provided that FISC
approves said activity within 72 hours).
24. Id.
25. 50U.S.C. §§ 1822(b)-1822(d) (2000).
26. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2) (2000).
27. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(2).
28. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(3)(A). The stattitor)' term "foreign power" incltides a group
engaged in international terrorism "whether or not [that group is] recognized by the
United States." 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 (a)(l), 1801(a)(4) (2000).
29. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)(A). The statutory term "agent of a foreign power"
includes one who "knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities
that are in preparation therefore, for or on behalf of a foreign power." 50 U.S.C. §
1801 (b) (2) (C) (2000).
30. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7).
31. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(4). The term "minimization" is defined at 50 U.S.C. §§
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information""^ and that "a significant purpose" of the electronic
surveillance or search is to obtain foreign intelligence
information." In order to issue a court order authorizing the
surveillance, the FISC judge reviewing the application must
specifically determine that there is probable cause to believe
that the target of the surveillance or search is a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power and that a significant purpose of the
electronic surveillance or search is to collect foreign
intelligence. Nevertheless, the representations in the application
must be accepted unless the FISC judge finds that they are
"clearly erroneous."''* In the case of a person residing in the
United States the FISC judge must also determine that the target
of the surveillance is not being considered an agent of a foreign
power based on activities protected by the First Amendment.^^
B. Constitutional Limitations of FISA
While the FISA rules regarding collection of foreign
intelligence in the United States are clearly spelled out in
statute, the question of whether or not the Executive Branch's
Article II"' power trumps FISA restrictions has never been
decided by the United States Supreme Court." In other words.
32. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804 (a)(6)(A)-1804(a){6))(B) (2000), 1823(a)7(A),
1823(a){7)(B) (2000).
33. Id. Following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed an
exhaustive piece of anti-terror legislation entitled "LFniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT) Act of 2001." USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2000). Among the many much needed changes to existing laws and regulations, the
USA PATRIOT act amended FISA to change the requirement then found in 50 U.S.C. §
1804 (a)(7)(B) from "the purpose" of the surveillance or search to "a significant
purpose." 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B) (2000).
34. United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 553 (4th Cir. 2000).
35. U.S. CONST, amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Covernment for a redress of grievances." Id.
36. U.S. CONST, art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The primary language setting out executive
authority is derived from Article II of the Constitution which provides that the President
"shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States."
37. See United Stales v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). Although
Article II of the Constitution specifically names the President as the Commander-in-
Chief, it does not mention the term "foreign affairs" as an executive power. Nevertheless,
the fact that the President has the primaiy responsibility for engaging in foreign affairs is
widely accepted. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, the most frequently cited Supreme Court case
that speaks to the matter, states:
Not only, as we have shown, is the federal power over external affairs in
origin and essential character different from that over internal affairs, but
participation in the exercise of the power is significandy limited. In this vast
external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold
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despite the fact that a string of presidents have operated under
the parameters of FISA when conducting foreign intelligence, it
is still an open question from the perspective of the Supreme
Court as to whether the President's Article II power exempts
him from the Fourth Amendment warrant requirements when
foreign intelligence is conducted, even if that foreign
intelligence collection takes place in the United States proper.
Thus, despite the limitations that FISA places on the President's
ability to conduct warrantless wiretaps on foreign agents in the
United States, no act of Congress can "oudaw" a constitutional
power of the Executive Branch that exists independently of the
powers of the other two branches of government.^"
The first Supreme Court rulings associated with warrandess
electronic surveillance came about in two 1967 cases, Katz v.
United Statei"^ and Berger v. Neiu York.'^ Both cases addressed the
matter in the context of domestic criminal activity. In Katz, the
Court held that any warrandess electronic surveillance,
including wiretaps, that violates a reasonable expectation of
privacy, is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.""'
Quickly following suit, the court in Berger set out a series of
requirements for the issuance of a valid warrant by a judge or
magistrate: (1) the warrant must describe with particularity the
communications to be heard; (2) there must be a showing of
probable cause that a crime has been committed, or is being
committed; (3) there must be a time limit on the surveillance;
(4) the suspect(s) whose communications are intercepted must
be named; (5) a return report must be made to the court
regarding the communications intercepted; and (6) electronic
surveillance must cease when warrant-approved information is
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of
the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate
cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.
Id.
38. "By the Constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain
important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is
accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience."
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 157, 165-66 (1803); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983) (declaring legislative vetoes unconstitutional).
39. Katz V. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
40. Berger V. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
41. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (ruling that warrantless searches "conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions").
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obtained.^ '^
While Katz and Berger were landmark cases in the area of
domesdc criminal electronic surveillance activides, it is
important to understand that the Katz majority refused to
address the need for a warrant in cases associated with national
security, stadng at footnote 23 of the opinion that "safeguards
other than prior authorizadon by a magistrate would satisfy the
Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the nadonal security
is a question not presented by this case." '^ Berger made no
reference to issues of nadonal security vis-à-vis electronic
surveillance.
The last dme that the Supreme Court spoke at any length on
the issue of the President's authority to conduct warrandess
electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence instances was in
1972. In United States v. United States District Court the Court was
asked to rule on a number of legal challenges brought on behalf
of three defendants who had been convicted of conspiracy to
bomb a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) office in Michigan."
The plot had been discovered by use of an electronic wiretap
authorized by then Attorney General John Mitchell without a
judicial warrant. While the Court ruled that warrandess
domestic electronic surveillance related to ordinary domestic
law enforcement was unconsdtudonal,"'' it clearly drew a strong
distinction between such common criminal invesdgations and
the matter of legitimate foreign intelligence electronic
surveillance.'"' When discussing a compelling interest of the
government in national security matters, the Court indicated
that there could be circumstances in which a specific electronic
surveillance could be conducted without a judicial warrant if it
was "reasonable both in reladon to the legitimate need of
Government for intelligence information and the protected
rights of our cidzens."^' The strong distincdon between
conducting electronic surveillance on domestic targets with no
ties to a "foreign power" and the President's surveillance power
towards actions of "foreign powers, within or without this
42, Berger, 388 U,S, at 55-57,
43, Kati, 389 U,S, at 358 n,23,
44, United States v, U,S, Dist, Court for E, Dist, of Mich,, S, Div,, 407 U,S, 297 (1972)
[hereinafter Keith}.
45, /d, at 320,
46, M a t 3 0 8 ,
47, Id. at 322-23,
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country"""* was set out at both the beginning of the per curium
opinion and at the end. At the beginning, the Court stated:
"Further, the instant case requires no judgment on the scope of
the President's surveillance power with respect to the activities
of foreign powers, within or without this country.""" Near the
end of the opinion, the Court wrote:
We empbasize, before concluding this opinion, the scope of
our decision. As stated at the outset, tbis case involves only tbe
domestic aspects of national security. We have not addressed,
and express no opinion as to, tbe issues wbicb may be involved
with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents.°°
If the Keith decision passed on the opportunity to fully address
the President's independent constitutional authority to conduct
warrantless electronic surveillance when the target was a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power, subsequent federal circuit
courts have been rather consistent in their view. Every U.S.
Court of Appeals to address the matter—both prior to and after
Keith—has held that the Executive Branch, by virtue of the
President's inherent authority under Article II, has the power to
conduct warrantless electronic surveillance for national security
reasons related to foreign powers and their agents.''
In the 1965 case of United States v. Brown, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the use of a warrantless wiretap
authorized by the Attorney General for foreign intelligence
purposes.'^ One of the issues before the court involved the
legality of incidental statements from an American citizen that
were intercepted as a result of the warrantless government
wiretap." The court upheld the warrantless wiretap, which
obtained the incidental statements, due to the "President's
constitutional duty to act for the United States in the field of
foreign relations, and his inherent power to protect national
48. Id. at 308.
49. Id.
50. M. at32t-22.
51. See also United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165, 171 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that the
law in question did not limit the President of the United States from taking any
necessary steps to protect national security), and FISA for the 21st Century: Hearing on S.
2453 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Bryan
Cunningham, Principal, Morgan & Cunningham, LLC), ("Federal appeals courts ruling
on the President's autliority to conduct foreign intelligence electronic surveillance
operations have recognized the President's constitutional preeminence in the collection
of foreign intelligence to protect our national security.").
52. United States v. Brown, 484 U.S. 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
53. M. at 424-425.
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security in the context of foreign affairs."''*
In 1974, the Third Circuit followed suit when it decided in
United States v. Butenko that warrantless electronic surveillance
was lawful so long as the primary purpose of the activity was to
obtain foreign intelligence.'''' The court in Butenko acknowledged
that the complex nature of society today makes sophisticated
techniques necessary "for gathering intelligence information
where national security is involved." "
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals next considered the issue
of warrantless electronic surveillance in the case of United States
V. Buckr In affirming the legality of such electronic surveillance
when authorized by the Executive to conduct surveillance of
foreign powers and agents of foreign powers, the court
specifically recognized this authority as an "exception to the
general warrant requirement."'"
The only post-FISA circuit court case dealing with the
President's power to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance
is the 1980 Fourth Circuit case of United States v. Truong Binh
Hung.^'^ At issue was the legality of a warrantless wiretap
authorized by the Attorney General to target a Vietnamese
national living in the United States. In the course of the year-
long electronic surveillance process, information was obtained
that ultimately assisted in the prosecution of Truong Dinh Hung
for passing classified U.S. government documents to an
informant for delivery to officials of the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam.**" Following Keith, the district court judge divided the
electronic surveillance activity into two parts—admitting into
evidence those that were done to collect foreign intelligence
information and excluding those later surveillance activities that
were done for domestic law enforcement. In reviewing, the
circuit court affirmed the President's constitutional power to
utilize warrantless wiretaps as a "'foreign intelligence' exception
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.""'
Understanding that countering "foreign threats to the national
54. Id. at 426.
55. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3rd Cir. 1974).
56. Id. at 624.
57. United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1977).
58. Id. at 875.
59. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
60. Id.
61. M at 912.
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security require the utmost stealth, speed, and secrecy,"'^ ''' the
Fourth Circuit affirmed that no warrant was required because of
the Executive's "constitutional prerogatives in the area of
foreign affairs,"''^  so long as the purpose of the warrantless
electronic surveillance was directed at "a foreign power, its
agents or collaborators.""''
The only other federal case of significant impact''^ is In re
Sealed Case, issued by the FISA Ct. Rev. in 2002."" In concluding
that the USA PATRIOT Act"' allowed domestic use of
intercepted evidence obtained by electronic surveillance so long
as a significant international foreign intelligence objective was in
view at the interception, the FISA Court of Review unanimously
stated:
The Troung court, as did all other courts to have decided the
issue, held that the President did have inherent authority to
conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence
information . . . . We take for granted that the President does
have that authority and, assuming that is so, FISA could not
encroach on the President's constitutional power.**
III. THE PROVISIONS O F THE PROTECT AMERICA ACT
As the head of the nation's Intelligence Community, it is not only
my desire, but my duty, to encourage changes to policies and
procedures, and where needed, legislation, to improve our ability to
provide warning of terrorist or other threats to our security!"
J. Michael McConnell
The purpose of the Protect America Act was to provide an
immediate update to FISA in order to give the intelligence
community the necessary tools required to gather information
62. Mat913.
63. /d. at 912.
64. /d. at 915.
65. But see Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert, denied,
425 U.S. 944 (1976) (noting, in a plurality opinion requiring a warrant to wiretap a
domestic target that was not an agent of a foreign power, that "an analysis of the polices
implicated by foreign security surveillance indicates that, absent exigent circumstances,
all warrantless electronic surveillance is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.").
66. In reSealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev.) (2002).
67. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2000).
68. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 742.
69. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Implementation of the Protect America Act:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, UOth Cong. 3 (2007) (statement ofj . Michael
McConnell, Director of National Intelligence).
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about potential foreign enemies.™ The preamble to the bill
states this goal as follows: "To amend the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 to provide additional procedures for
authorizing certain acquisitions of foreign intelligence
information."
The legislative history reveals that the bill was introduced in
the Senate on August 1, 2007,'' passed in the Senate on August
3, 2007," passed in the House on August 4, 2007," and signed
into law by President Bush on August 5, 2007." The vote in the
House of Representatives was 227 to 183," with 41 Democrats
supporting and 181 opposing; 186 Republicans voted in support
and 2 opposed. The vote in the Senate was 60 in favor and 28
opposed with 15 Democrats supporting and 28 opposing; 45
Republicans voted to support and none voted to oppose.
As the Director of Intelligence Mike McConnell related in his
September 25, 2007 statement before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, the heart of the Protect America Act is the provision
that does away with the need to obtain "court approval when the
target of the acquisition is a foreign intelligence target located
outside the United States."™ To accomplish this, the Protect
America Act limits the construction of the term "electronic
surveillance"™ so that it does not apply to a person reasonably
70. Fact Sheet: The Protect America Act of 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov (last
visited August 29, 2007).
71. Protect America Act of 2007: Modifications to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 1927, 121 Stat. 552 (2007).
72. GovTrack.us Web Page, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sllO-
1927 (last visited Dec. 31, 2008).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (CRS) REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, SUMMARY (AUGUST 23,2007).
76. GovTrack.us Web Page, http://\vmv.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sllO-
1927 (last visited Dec. 31, 2008).
77. Id.
78. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Implementation of the Protect America Act:
Hearing Before the S. Gomm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 9 (2007) (statement of J. Michael
McConnell, Director of National Intelligence).
79. 50U.S.C. §1801 (f) (2008):
Prior to the enactment of the Protect America Act of 2007, "electronic
surveillance" had been defined for purposes of FISA to mean:
(f) "Electronic surveillance" means—
(1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio
communication sent by or intended to be received by a
particular, known United States persono who is in the United
States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that
United States person, under circumstances in which a person has
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believed to be located outside the United States. Secdon 105A of
FISA states: "Nothing in the definition of electronic surveillance
under secdon 101 (f) shall be construed to encompass
surveillance directed at a person reasonably believed to be
located outside the United States."*" The Protect America Act
thus restores FISA to its original intent and is closer in line with
judicial case law regarding the Executive's power to conduct
intelligence operadons directed at foreign targets.**' The Protect
America Act allows collection of communications completely
foreign in nature without obtaining a warrant**^
Nevertheless, the mechanics of the process sdll include
notifying the FISA Court of any warrandess surveillance
operadon within seventy-two hours of authorizadon.*''
a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant wotild be
reqtiired for law enforcement purposes;
(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device of the contents of any wire communication to
or from a person in the United States, without the consent of any
party thereto, if stich acquisition occurs in the United States, but
does not incltide the acqtiisition of those commtinications of
computer trespassers tbat would be permissible under section
2511 (2) (i) of Tide 18;
(3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or
other surveillance device of the contents of any radio
communication, under circtmistances in which a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be
required for law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender
and all intended recipients are located within the United States;
or
(4) the installation or tise of an electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to
acquire infonnation, other than from a wire or radio
communication, under circumstances in which a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be
reqtiired for law enforcement purposes,
80, Protect America Act of 2007: Modifications to the Foreign Intelligence
Sun'eillance Act, Pub, L, No, 110-55, Sec, 105A, 121 Stat, 552 (2007),
81, See United States v, Butenko, 494 F,2d 593 {3rd Cir, 1974) (holding that that
warrantless electronic stirveillance was lawful so long as the primary purpose of the
activity was to obtain foreign intelligence),
82, See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Implementation of the Protect America Act:
Hearing Before tlie S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong, 3, 9 (2007) (statement of J,
Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence) (explaining that the definition of
electronic surveillance does not incltide a person thought be outside the United States
which means no cotirt approval is needed to target an individual outside the United
States),
83, Protect America Act of 2007: Modifications to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, Pub, L, No, 110-55, §105B(a), 121 Stat, 552 (2007), Section 105B
begins by providing that:
Motwitfistanding any other law, the Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General, may for periods of up to one year authorize the acquisition
of foreign intelligence information concerning persons reasonably believed to
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The Protect America Act also requires communications
providers to cooperate with the Attorney General and the
Director of National Intelligence to provide whatever technical
support might be necessary to acquire information associated
with the targeting of individuals outside the United States.^ ^ In
tandem with this requirement, the Protect America Act provides
protection for third-parties from private lawsuits arising from
any government assistance that the third-parties may provide.**''
In regards to reporting requirements, the Protect America Act
at section 4 requires the Attorney General to report to Congress
any incidents of noncompliance as well as the number of
directives issued. Moreover, semi-annually officials are to update
these committees as to the number of directives tbat were issued
in that year under the authority conferred by section 105B.*"'
be located otitside of the United States if the DNI and Attorney General
determine that based tipon the information proNided to them, that—
(1) there are reasonable procedures in place for determining that the
acquisition of foreign intelligence information tinder this section
concerns persons reasonably believed to be located outside the
United States, and such procedures will be stibject to review of the
Court ptirstiant to section 105C of tbis Act;
(2) the acquisition does not constitute electronic surveillance;
(3) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign intelligence
information from or with the assistance of a communications senice
provider, custodian, or other person (inckiding any officer,
employee, agent, or other specified person of stich ser\'ice provider,
custodian, or other person) who has access to communications,
either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or
equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store sticb
commtinications;
(4) a significant purpose of the acqtiisition is to obtain foreign
intelligence information; and
(5) the minimization procedtires to be tised with respect to such
acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization procedures
under section lOl(h).
84. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Implementation of the Protect America Act:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 3, 10 (2007) (statement of J.
Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence). The Attorney Ceneral and
Director of National Sectirity may direct a person to provide the Government with all
information, facilities, and assistance necessary and in a manner that will protect secrecy.
Ftirther it is provided that the Government shall compensate said person for providing
said information, facilities, and assistance. If the person fails to comply as directed, the
Attorney General may invoke the aid of the Foreign Intelligence Stirveillance Act (FISC)
to compel compliance with the directive. A FISC order can be isstied reqtiiring the
person to comply tinder threat of contempt of cotirt if the directive is lawftil. However,
the person in receipt of a directive may challenge its legality by filing a petition with the
petition pool of the FISC.
85. Id.
86. Protect America Act of 2007; Modifications to the Foreign Intelligence
Sur\'eillance Act, Pub. L. No. 110-55, §4, 121 Stat. 52, 50 U.S.C. §1805C (2000). The
stattite states:
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Finally, the Protect America Act requires FISA Court
involvement in determining that reasonable procedures are
used in ascertaining whether a target is outside the United
States.*" New section 105C deals specifically with the required
submissions and the assessments that are to be made by the FISC
regarding the acquisitions conducted pursuant to new section
105B.'*'^  Clearly, the necessity of this function stems from the new
statutory definition of "electronic surveillance." Accordingly, the
Attorney General is required to submit to the FISA Court"" the
procedures that the government employs in determining that
the acquisitions authorized under 105B do not constitute
electronic surveillance. Moreover, within 180 days after
enactment of the Protect America Act, the FISA Court must
assess whether the government's determination under section
105B(l) is founded upon procedures that are "reasonably
designed to ensure that acquisitions conducted pursuant to
section 105B do not constitute electronic surveillance" are
clearly erroneous." The FISA Court is required to enter an
order approving the continued use of the procedures, unless
they are to be found to be clearly erroneous. However, should
the FISA Court find the government's determination to be
clearly erroneous, new procedures must be submitted "within 30
days" or any acquisitions under section 105B must cease." Any
order issued by the FISA Court finding said procedures to be
clearly erroneous may be appealed to the FISCCR.'^  If the
FISCCR finds that the order by the FISA Court was properly
entered, the government may then seek Supreme Court review
through the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari.^^ During the
On a semi-annual basis the Attorney General shall inform the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the Committee on the Jtidiciary
of the Senate, and the Committee on the judiciary of the Hotise of
Representatives, concerning acquisitions under this section during the
previous 6-month period.
87. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Implementation of the Protect America Act:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 3, 10 (2007) (statement of J.
Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence).
88. Protect America Act of 2007: Modifications to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 110-55, §4, 121 Stat. 52, 50 U.S.C. §1805C(a) (2000).
89. Id. § 1805C(c).
90. Id.§ 1805C(b).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. § 1805C(d) (saying that if the Court of Review affirms the FISC order, the
Court of Review mtist immediately prepare a written statement of each of tlie reasons for
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review process, the acquisitions affected by the FISA Court order
at issue may continue.
rv. CRITICISMS OF THE PROTECT AMERICA ACT
The so-called "Protect America Act of 2007, " which we are calling
the "Police America Act, " allows for massive, untargeted collection of
international communications without court order or meaningful
oversight by either Congress or the courts.^''
Just as calls for increased security must be weighed against
protecting cherished civil liberties, all criticisms of increased
security measures such as the Protect America Act must be
weighed against a realistic understanding of the threat to
national security. Although the United States has not suffered
another mega-terror strike on the homeland since the al-Qa'eda
attack of September 11, 2001, the threat to the United States
posed by al-Qa'eda and al-Qa'eda-like Islamic terrorists has not
diminished.
A. Understanding the Threat
Cloaking itself in a "religious"'" fanaticism, these al-Qa'eda-
styled jihadists are set on using violence against the United
States in order to kill tens of thousands, if possible."'' This point
cannot be seriously debated or doubted. The 2004 bipartisan
9/11 Commission Report found that the United States is facing
a loose confederation of people who believe in a perverted
stream of Islam and are busy building the groundwork for
decades of struggle."' Similarly, the July 2007 National
its decision. Should the government file a certiorari petition, that written record would
be transmitted tinder seal to the U.S. Supreme Court).
94. American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Fact Sheet on the "Police America Act,"
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/nsaspying/31203res20070807.html (last visited Dec. 31,
2008).
95. See, e.g., Jeffrey F. Addicott, The Misuse of Religion in the Global War on Terrorism, 7
BARRY L. REV. 109 (2006) (discussing how al-Qa'eda-styled terrorism conducts mtirder in
the name of religion and the concept of jihad as an obligation to engage in "holy war").
96. Id.
97. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORISTATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 51 (2004).
[Bin Ladin and al-Qa'eda] say that America had attacked Islam; America is
responsible for all conflicts involving Muslims. Thtis Americans are blamed
when Israelis fight with Palestinians, when Rtissians fight with Chechens, when
Indians fight with Kashmiri Mtislims, and when the Philippine government
fights ethnic Muslims in its sotithern islands. America is also held responsible
for the governments of Muslim countries, derided by al Qaeda as "your
agents." Bin Ladin has stated flatly, "Our fight against these governments is
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Intelligence Estimate (NIE) endued: Terrorist Threat to the
U.S. Homeland, spells out the clear and present danger posed
by al-Qa'eda against the United States.""
not separate from our fight against you." These charges found a ready
audience among millions of Arabs and Muslims angry at the United States
because of issues ranging from Iraq to Palestine to America's support for their
countries' repressive nilers.
Id.
98. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAI. INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE, THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND 6 (2007); see also FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROTECT AMERICA ACT:
HEARING BEFORE THE S. COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, 110th Cong. 7-9 (2007) (statement of
J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence). In his September 25, 2007
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Director of National Intelligence,
J. Michael McConnell, highlighted the following threats:
• The U.S. Homeland will face a persistent and evohing terrorist threat over the
next three years. The main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups and
cells, especially al-Qa'eda, driven by their undiminished intent to attack the
Homeland and a contintied effort by these terrorist grotips to adapt and
improve their capabilities.
• Greatly increased worldwide cotinterterrorism efforts over the past five years
have constrained the ability of al-Qa'eda to attack the U.S. Homeland again
and have led terrorist groups to perceive the Homeland as a harder target to
strike than on 9/11.
• 1-Qa'eda is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland,
as its central leadership continties to plan high-impact plots, while pushing
others in extremist Stinni commtinities to mimic its efforts and to supplement
its capabilities. We assess that the grotip has protected or regenerated key
elements of its Homeland attack capability, inchiding: a safehaven in the
Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lietitenants,
and its top leadership. Although we have discovered only a handful of
individuals in the United States with ties to al-Qa'eda senior leadership since
9/11, we judge that al-Qa'eda will intensify its efforts to put operatives here. As
a result, we judge that the United States currently is in a heightened threat
environment.
• We assess that al-Qa'eda will continue to enhance its capabilities to attack the
Homeland through greater cooperation with regional terrorist groups. Of
note, we assess that al-Qa'eda will probably seek to leverage the contacts and
capabilities of al-Qa'eda in Iraq.
• We assess that al-Qa'eda's Homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on
prominent political, economic, and infrastructtire targets with the goal of
producing mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic
aftershocks, and/or fear among the U.S. population. The grotip is proficient
with conventional small arms and improvised explosive devices, and is
innovative in creating new capabilities and overcoming security obstacles.
• We assess that al-Qa'eda will continue to try to acqtiire and employ chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear material in attacks and would not hesitate
to tise them if it develops what it deems is sufficient capability.
• We assess Lebanese Hizballah, which has conducted anti-U.S. attacks outside
the United States in the past, may be more likely to consider attacking the
Homeland over the next three years if it perceives the United States as posing
a direct threat to the group or Iran.
• We assess that globalization trends and recent technological advances will
continue to enable even small ntimbers of alienated people to find and
connect with one another, jtistify and intensify their anger, and mobilize
resotirces to attack—all withotit reqtiiring a centralized terrorist organization,
training camp, or leader.
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As a consequence of the War on Terror," both the Execudve
and Legislative Branches of government have employed a wide
variety of new legal and policy inidatives to address the threat
posed by both al-Qa'eda-styled terrorism and rogue states who
possess weapons of mass destruction.'"" Designed to disrupt
terrorist networks and prevent future terrorist attacks from
occurring, these new tools include such things as: the passage of
the USA PATRIOT Act;"" the creadon of the Department of
Homeland Security;'"^ the establishment of United States
Northern Command, in Colorado;'"^ the passage of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006,'"^ the use of military force against the
Taliban government in Afghanistan,'°° the preemptive use of
military force against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein,""^ and
the resulting indefinite detention of suspected terrorists who are
illegal aliens and unlawful enemy combatants. In short, the
central challenge that the United States faces, along with the
rest of the civilized world, is how to realistically engage these
Id.
99, Bush, supra note 9,
100, See NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (2002),
available at http;//www,whitehouse,gov/news/releases/2002/l 2/WMDStrategy,pdf
(describing the United States' strategy titilizing cotinterproliferation, nonproliferation,
and conseqtience management to address the threat of use of Weapons of Mass
Destruction against the United States and its friends and allies),
101, See USA PATRIOT Act, 115 Stat 272, The bill passed in the Senate by a vote of
98-1, 147 CONG, REG, S11059-60 (2001), The Hotise of Representatives passed their
version by a vote of 357-66, Hotise Vote on H.R, 3162 (Oct, 24, 2001),
http://clerk,hotise,gov/evs/2001/roll398,xml,
102, Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U,S,C, §§ 101-C12 (2006),
103, "U,S, Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was established Oct, 1, 2002 to
provide command and control of Department of Defense (DoD) homeland defense
efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities," About U,S, Northern
Command, http://www,northcom,mil/About/index,html (last visited Nov, 7, 2008),
104, 10U,S,C, §948 (2006),
105, Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, S,J, Res, 23, 107th
Cong, (2001), This resolution was passed by every member of the Senate and every
member of the House of Representatives, save one. Id. Among other things, the
Congressional Resolution recognized the authority of the President " , , , under die
Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against
the United States," Id. The resolution also stated:
[T]he President is atithorized to tise all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
atithorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored stich organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by
stich nations, organizations or persons.
Id.
106, The Iraq War was atithorized by a Congressional use of force resolution which
specifically found that Iraq stipported international terrorism and was in development of
weapons of mass destruction. Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution of 2002, H,R,J, Res, 114, 107th Cong, (2002),
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new enemies while providing the highest level of protection for
American civil liberties.
One issue is certain in this debate: due to the universalist
designs of al-Qa'eda and al-Qa'eda-styled militant Islam, the use
of a one-dimensional criminal justice system designed to
respond to terrorist attacks can neither confront nor contain an
ideology of hate able to infect thousands of followers and deploy
secretive terrorist cells across the globe. Nevertheless, the use of
the government's new methodologies designed to thwart
terrorist attacks and similar aggression has caused some to
challenge such measures as illegal (note that there is a vast
difference between calling something wrongheaded and calling
it illegal). It is no surprise then that a deep fissure runs through
the legal and political debate.
As in all wars, the need for accurate intelligence is crucial to
success. In the War on Terror, where the enemy fights
asymmetrically, i.e., the terrorist does not wear a uniform, does
not carry his arms openly, nor does he abide by any of the
humanitarian precepts of the law of war,'"' the need for accurate
intelligence is absolutely paramount. For instance, security
measures to stop the terrorist at the airport are far too late. The
terrorist must be stopped prior to ever approaching the airport.
Since the terrorist "hides amongst us" and generally denies any
affiliation with terrorism (if one can engage in the murder of
civilians, one can certainly be expected to lie and deceive), any
antiterrorism'"** efforts must be built around the gathering of
107. The basic goal of the law of war is to limit the impact of the inevitable evils of war
by: "(1) protecting botli combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary stiffering; (2)
safegtiarding certain ftindamental htiman rights of persons who fall into the hands of the
enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and civilians; and (3) facilitating
tlie restoration of peace." DEPARTMENT OF ARÍVH', FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF L/\ND
WARFARE, para. 2 (1956), owii'/rtife ni http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/law_
warfare-1956.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2008). The ctirrent corpus of the law of war
consists of all those treaties and customar)' principles that are applicable to war. /(/. The
1949 Geneva Conventions serve as the primary source for the law of war and cover four
basic categories: (1) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Augtist 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; (2) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; (3) Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Atigust 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; and (4) Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protections of Ci\'ilian Persons in Time of War, Atigust 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
108. Antiteriorism involves all those steps and actions taken to decrease the
probability of a terrorist attack. It is proactive and can involve electronic surveillance,
modeling techniques and the use of other intelligence gathering devices. By contrast.
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solid intelligence, to include electronic surveillance. In this
light, one of the more controversial actions taken by the Bush
Administration was the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), a
secret program authorized after the September 11, 2001 terror
attacks and revealed to the public in December of 2005. The
TSP employed the use of warrantless wiretaps to monitor the
messages of foreigners that passed through communication links in
the United States as well as those communications where one party
was operating outside the United States.'"" While the exact details of
the TSP remain classified, several media reports purportedly
contained details of the program, which suggested the use of data
mining and traffic analysis."" Additionally, public statements made
by administration ofEicitils indicate that the TSP involved
interceptions when there was "a reasonable basis to conclude that
one party to the communication is a member of al-Qa'eda, affiliated
with al-Qa'eda, or a member of an organization affiliated with al-
Qa'eda, or working in support of al-Qa'eda."'" When the TSP was
revealed to the general public by the New York Times newspaper,"^
the Bush Administration made a policy decision to put the
program under the purview of the FISA court."' Then, in 2007,
when one of the FISA judges issued a secret ruling questioning
some aspects of the revised process,"^ the Bush Administration
pushed for swift Congressional legislation to address the
counterteriorism involves those tactical measures taken in response to an actual terrorist
attack.
109. Press Release, The White House, Setting the Record Straight: Democrats
Continue to Attack Terrorist Surveillance Program (Jan. 22, 2006) (on file with St.
Mary's University School of Law, Center for Terrorism Law).
110. See Shane Harris, How Does the NSA Spy?, NAT'L J., Jan. 20, 2006, at 47, 49
(noting that although the precise details of the NSA remain classified, press reports
indicate that data mining and traffic analysis technologies are being employed).
111. Press Release, White Hotise, Press Briefmg by Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National
Intelligence (December 19, 2005).
112. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al. (The article cites anonymous government officials regarding
the use of warrantless eavesdropping on persons inside the United States "based on
classified legal opinions that assert that the president has broad powers to order such
searches, derived in part from the September 2001 Congressional resoltition authorizing
him to wage war on Al Qa'eda and other terrorist groups.").
113. "I was pleased that the [Bush] Administration submitted the [Terrorist
Surveillance Program] TSP to the FISA Court, and that the Court had found a way to
issue an order approving this surveillance." 153 CONG. REC. S4480-01 (daily ed. Apr. 16,
2007) (statement by Sen. Feinstein).
114. Hotise Minority Leader John A. Boehner stated, "There's been a rtiling, over the
last four or five months, that prohibits the ability of otir intelligence services and our
counterintelligence people from listening in to two terrorists in other parts of the world
where the communication could come through the United States." Greg Miller, Court
Puts Limits on Surveillance Abroad, L.A. TIMES, August 2, 2007, at A16.
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concerns."' Apparently, the concerns led the FISA court to
conclude that communications between two individuals located
outside the United States could no longer be intercepted
without a FISA warrant if those communications passed through
an internet switch (node) located in the United States."*' After
an intense push by the Bush Administration to secure at least
temporary amendments to the statutory framework of FISA,
before Congress adjourned from their summer legislative
sessions, the end result was the passage of the Protect America
Act.'"
B. Challenging the Protect America Act
A review of most of the reasoned critics of the Protect America
Act shows that concerns fall into two general categories. On the
one hand, some critics argue that the statute is not only too
confusing but that the very terminology and language utilized in
the statute opens the door to possible abuse by the intelligence
community."* In part, criticism is fueled by the fact that FISA
itself is too complicated, but the argument is actually more
properly seen as a fear of unintended consequences. On the
other hand, some believe that the Executive Branch's provision
of warrantless wiretap authority is simply unconstitutional, ab
initio, particularly when it involves any person, place, or thing
associated with the United States proper.
To take the complex and make it understandable is always a
daunting task. Again, critics who fall into the first category
generally lament the complexity of FISA and then wonder about
the impact of the language revisions set forth in the Protect
America Act. For instance, in Suzanne Spaulding's September
25, 2007 testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee
hearing on "Strengthening FISA: Does the Protect America Act
Protect Americans' Civil Liberties and Enhance Security?," she
argued in particular that the Protect America Act was flawed
because it altered the definition of the term "electronic
surveillance" to exclude persons reasonably believed to be
115. For an overview of the chronolog)' see CRS Report RL34279, supra note 8, at 7-
8.
116. Miller, j«/)ra note 114, at Al 6.
117. See David Ignatitis, Dangerous Logjam on Survällance, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2007,
at B7 (providing an overview of the chronology of events).
118. Strengthening EISA: Does the Protect America Act Protect Americans' Civil Liberties and
Enhance Security?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007)
(statement of Suzanne E. Spaiilding, Principal, Bingham Consulting Grotip).
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outside the United States. Spavilding testified: "First, I would
urge Congress to avoid trying to accomplish objectives by
changing definitions. The terms in FISA not only appear
throughout this complex statute [FISA]; they are also
referenced in or inform other laws, Executive Orders, directives,
policies, etc. The risk of unintended consequences is
significant.""'
Other objections for those who fall into the first category
range from the fact that the Protect America Act does not
contain the word 'terrorism' or 'terrorist' to the use of the
language "notwithstanding any other law" contained in section
105B of the Act,'*" which some interpret as free license to
authorize such actions as "intercepting US mail between two
people inside the United States, so long as the government
reasonably helieves the letter discusses, at least in part, someone
outside the US."'^ ^
Of course, to anyone even marginally familiar with the FISA
rules, the criticism that the Protect America Act is somehow
disingenuous because it fails to mention the term "terrorism"
and instead only mentions "foreign" powers is a shallow
argument. The term "foreign power" as denned by 50 U.S.C. §
1801 (a) (4)-(5) includes "a group engaged in international
terrorism or activities in preparation therefore" or "a foreign-
based political organization, not substantially composed of
United States persons.""' Thus, foreign powers include
terrorists,'^' and al-Qa'eda and any similar terrorist organization
is properly classified as a "foreign power."'^ ^
Similarly, the fears that the government will engage in
119. Id.
120. Strengthening FISA, supranote 118.
Despite this new law having been explained to the Ainerican puhlic as
necessary to protect them from the next terrorist attack, none of die
intelligence collection it authorizes has to be related in any way to terrorism. It
applies to any "foreign intelligence," a term which has been amended over the
years to include a very broad range of information.
Id.
121. Id.; Protect America Act of 2007, supranole 2, § 105B.
122. Id.
123. 50U.S.C. §1801(a)(4)-(5).
124. See United States v. Sqtiillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 553 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that
a FISA application to perform electronic surveillance of a foreign power or its agents
must specify reasons for this concltision).
125. See United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(holding that an international terrorist organization was properly classified as a foreign
power for purposes of foreign intelligence gathering).
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"reverse targedng," i.e., conduct electronic surveillance without
a warrant on a person "reasonably believed to be located outside
of the United States," but in reality focusing on a person located
in the United States,''"' are vastly overstated. Such activity is not
authorized by the Protect America Act and would be a clear
violation of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(l)."'
Those in the second category generally craft their arguments
in terms of analyzing the gathering of any and all electronic
surveillance purely from a domestic law enforcement viewpoint,
rejecdng the nodon that the Execudve Branch has independent
authority to conduct electronic surveillance of foreign powers
for purposes of national security.'^ ** In turn, most would also
reject the nodon that the United States is at "war," treating the
matter as distracdng rhetoric. For them, the phrase "War on
Terror" is more similar to the Reagan era "war on drugs" or the
Johnson era "wars on poverty." It is not a "real" war and
therefore the use of, for example, military commissions,
warrandess wiretaps of foreign powers, and other wardme
powers of the government would be quite illegal and
unconstitutional.
In his September 25, 2007, tesdmony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, James Dempsey exemplified the second
category of crides. Dempsey engaged in a lengthy cridque of the
Protect America Act, admitting that while the Supreme Court
has never ruled on the issue of whether warrandess electronic
surveillance to collect foreign intelligence in the context of
national security is constitutional, the federal circuit opinions
set out in Butenko™ and TruongDinh Hung"" indicate to him that
the Protect America Act is an excessive exercise of authority.
"The PAA falls short of the standards enunciated in Butenko
and Truong. It is not limited to searches of the communicadons
of foreign powers or agents of foreign powers. Searches under
the PAA are not based on probable cause. They are not
reasonably limited in duradon."'"
126, Hearing on the Foreign Intelligence Surveilkmce Act Before the Permanent House Select
Committee on Intelligence, 110th Cong, (2007) (statement of Kenneth L, Wainstein, Asst,
Attorney General, National Security Division, Department of Justice),
127, 50U,S,C, §1801(f)(l),
128, See generally Maxione Cohn, http://niajoriecohn,com (last visited Dec, 31, 2008),
129, United States v, Butenko, 494 F,2d 593 (3rd Cir, 1974),
130, United States v, Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F,2d 908 (4th Cir, 1980),
131, Strengthening FISA: Does the Protect America Act Protect Americans' Civil Liberties and
Enhance Security?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong, (2007)
(statement of James Dempsey, Policy Director, Center for Democracy and Technology),
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At the root of most reasoned critics of the Protect America Act
is how new section 105A (of FISA) exempts from its statutory
definition of electronic surveillance a broad class of surveillance
activities. As a consequence, the scope of new activity outside of
the old FISA framework is susceptible to varying constructions.
This potential for confusion presents concern especially when
viewed against the ambiguity within the text, which will
necessarily require interpretation by the Executive Branch. In
addition, because of the classified nature of the informadon
involved, little opportunity exists for the public to discover the
actual construction that the text received.
V. CONCLUSION
The most important weapon in the War on Terror is intelligence
and our first line of defense is reliable intelligence.
Micbael T. McCaul'"
If the most important weapon in the War on Terror is
intelligence, then America's first Une of defense must be
anchored on reliable intelligence. America's ability to gather
and analyze intelligence is much greater than that of al-Qa'eda-
132. On July 9, 2008, the Senate passed by a 69-28 vote and President Bush signed
into law H.R. 6304, "The FISA Amendments Act of 2008." The House of Representatives
had previously adopted this legislation by a 293-129 vote on June 20, 2008. This
bipartisan revision of FISA strengthens the government's ability to secure intelligence
through monitoring phone conversations in a timely manner. A presidential
administration must still obtain approval from a special FISA court in advance of
conducting the surveillance. However, the law also gives the government flexibility
during emergency situations to act first and seek retroactive approval from the court
within seven days. Further, the law addresses the liability issues of telecommunication
companies that provided information to our intelligence agencies after the tragedy of
9/11 by allowing the phone companies the ability to have such suits dismissed if they can
prove they acted under orders from the president to detect or prevent a terrorist threat.
The bill has built-in protections for Americans traveling abroad as well by prohibiting
the intelligence community from intentionally targeting a U.S. citizen who is located
outside of our borders under circumstances in which that person has a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" and in which a warrant would be required in the U.S. The
exceptions would be if there is FISA court approval or if the Attorney General has
authorized an emergency acquisition.
Rep. McCaul said:
This bill gives us the tools to capture foreign intelligence to protect
America, and it closes the terrorist loophole in this country. Foreign terrorists
abroad who are plotting to attack the United States will no longer be
protected. The ability to listen in on potential foreign terrorists as they lay the
groundwork for attacking the United States is essential to the security of this
country and the safety of every American. . . . This takes the handcuffs off of
our intelligence community and will undoubtedly save lives. This bill strikes
the right balance between Americans' right to privacy and our country's needs
to gather intelligence.
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st)'led terrorists, and this advantage must be maintained.
National security requires that every lawful means be employed
to gather pertinent information. The American people rightfully
expect that their government will continue to use every lawful
tool available to protect them. In so doing, however, important
safeguards are necessary to protect the civil liberties afforded
under the Constitution's First and Fourth Amendments.
The Protect America Act, which was signed into law in August
of 2007, closed the unacceptable intelligence gaps that had
arisen because of the application of the FISA to foreign persons
in foreign countries who were never intended to be covered by
FISA. Wliile operating under these unnecessary restrictions,
intelligence agencies probably missed a significant portion of
the information that was needed to protect the country and to
pursue the al-Qa'eda-styled terrorists with whom America is at
war.
While the debate on the efficacy of the Protect America Act
will continue to color subsequent amendments to FISA, the
Protect America Act allowed U.S. intelligence services the lawful
right to resume collecting this information while still protecting
the civil liberties of American citizens. The Protect America Act
has contributed to efforts to detect and prevent another
catastrophic terrorist attack on the United States. Terrorism-
related arrests in England, Germany, and Denmark during the
summer of 2007 lend proof to the need for timely intelligence
collection.'" In his 2007 testimony before the House Judiciary
Committee, Director of National Intelligence, Admiral J.
Michael McConnell testified that prior to the Protect America
Act the Intelligence Community was not collecting 66% of the
foreign intelligence information that it used to collect before
legal interpretations required the government to obtain FISA
court orders for overseas surveillance."*^ It is critical that the
professionals at U.S. intelligence agencies have the ability and
authority to collect information on foreign terrorists without
133. Terrorism and the Law, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/sectirity/terrorism-and-
the-law/; Danish Airests 'Prevent Terrorism',
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/eiirope/09/04/danish.terror/index.htnil;
Mark Lander, Cernían Police Arrest 3 in Terrorist Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.coni/2007/09/06/world/europe/06germany.html.
134. Letter from Director of National Intelligence (DNI) J.M. McConnell to House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Silvestre Reyes (July 25, 2007)
(unclassified).
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cumbersome regulations requiring court orders and oversight
that was never intended to be applied to such situations.
Since the passage of The Protect America Act, there have
been numerous legislative attempts to scale back many of the
important legislative provisions necessary to gather the best
information possible to protect the nation from terrorism.'^'
Some of these attempts would go far beyond the original intent
of FISA. Contrary to some of the rhetoric, it is the members of
al-Qa'eda, not American citizens that are the target of lawful
intelligence gathering activities.
Legislative proposals should not stop intelligence
professionals from conducting surveillance of foreign persons in
foreign countries. Obviously, intelligence professionals cannot
read the minds and intent of their targets so as to guarantee that
those terrorist targets would not call the United States or a
United States person. Furthermore, revisions in the FISA should
not provide intelligence targets more protection than Americans
receive under court-ordered warrants in organized crime and
other criminal investigations.
The advances in telecommunications technology over the last
30 years mandate that FISA keep pace with the attendant
heightened threat to national security. Terroiist tactics
constantly change in response to American efforts to disrupt
their plots, so essential intelligence tools and associated legal
requirements for their use must be modernized. Although the
Protect America Act served as a temporary fix, intelligence
professionals need a long-term legal framework that provides
certainty and clarity in order to aggressively collect the
information necessary to protect the American people.
135. The 110th Congress has been very active in developing and considering
measures to amend FISA since the Protect America Act, P.L. 110-55, was enacted into law
on Angtist 5, 2007. It expired on Febrtiaiy 16, 2008, after passage of a 15-day extension
to its original sunset date. P.L. 110-182, available at http://mvw.congress.gov/cgi-
lis/bdquery/R?dll0:FLD002:@]%28110+182%29. On November 15, 2007, the House of
Representatives passed H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act of 2007, available at
lutp://www.congress.gov/cgi-lis/bdqtiery/z?dllO:H.R.3773:. On Febrtiary 12, 2008, the
Senate passed S. 2248, available at http://www.congress.gov/cgi-
lis/bdquery/z?dnO:S.2248:, as amended, then strtick all but the enacting clause of H.R.
3773, and inserted the text of S. 2248, as amended, in its stead. On March 14, 2008, the
House passed an amendment to the Senate amendment to H.R. 3773. After months of
intensive negotiations, on June 19, 2008, a compromise bill, H.R. 6304, The FISA
Amendments Act of 2008, available at http://www.congress.gov/cgi-
lis/bdquery/z?dllO:H.R.63O4:, was introduced in the House and was passed by the
Hotise the following day. The Senate passed the bill on July 9, and it was signed into law
by President Bush on July 10, 2008 as P.L. 110-261.
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Prior to the Protect America Act, Congress seemed content to
ignore repeated warnings about the intelligence gap, even while
cumbersome FISA restrictions hindered, for example, the
search for three kidnapped American soldiers in Iraq, one of
whom was killed while two are still missing in action.'"' Any
legislative proposal that would bring back the nonsensical
requirements for an advance court order to conduct overseas
surveillance that unnecessarily delays intelligence collection
must be rejected. Advance court review of intelligence activities
against foreign targets does nothing to protect the civil liberties
of Americans but does unduly hamper America's ability to fight
terrorism.
Congress and the Executive must act to improve on the gains
made by the Protect America Act and give permanent and
effective legal authorities which will assist in closing existing
intelligence gaps against potential foreign terrorists in foreign
countries. In a floor speech given just prior to the adoption of
the Protect American Act, Congressman Michael McCaul
warned:
Our most solemn duty in the United States Congress is to
protect the American people; and while this bill [H.R. 3356,
Improving Foreign Intelligence to Defend the Nation and the
Constitution Act]—^which weakens the Protect America Act—
may be well intentioned, it fails to do that. In fact, just the
opposite. It puts the American people in great danger. Before
running for Congress, I worked in the Justice Department. I
worked on national security, wiretaps and FISA. The intention
of the FISA Act was never to apply to agents of a foreign power
in a foreign country. It was to apply to agents of a foreign
power in this country. This bill does just the opposite. It
expands it to bar a collection of foreign intelligence on
foreign targets in foreign countries. I am concerned that if we
cannot collect intelligence overseas that we cannot protect our
war fighter in the battlefield. We put them in danger, and we
put the citizens of this country in danger. We all know that al
Qaeda is looking at hitting us again. It may be very soon. And
with the anniversary of 9/11 approaching, we must do
everything we can to protect her.'"
136. See Pauline Jelinek, Senior Al-Qaida Leader Reported Kilted In Airstrike, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (MO), Sept. 29, 2007, at A30 (referring to the kidnapping).
137. Floor speech by Congressman Michael McCaul (TX-10) during floor debate of
the H.R. 3356, Improving Foreign Intelligence to Defend the Nation and the
Constitution Act (IMPROVE Act), August 3, 2007. This bill was considered by the House
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the day before the debate on the Protect America Act, The IMPROVE Act failed on
Suspension of the Rules by a vote of 218 to 207,

